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TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

ATTEMPTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE "ALLAIS" PARADOX
Edward D. Booth
University of Nebraska, Lincoln.

A long standing debate among decision and value theorists concerns the
consistency of individual as well as collective preferences. Two traditional yet
diametrically opposed positions have been staked out. A von Neumann.
Morgenstern decision theorist (hereafter reference to the von Neumann.
Morgenstern system will be abbreviated NM) maintains that individual
preferences are exhibited behavioristically and that from empirical observa.
tions alone a consistent set of axioms can be (or have been) constructed
which describe and predict individual decision making and, in addition, may
be regarded as norms of future behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1953: 31-33). Others have denied that such a set of axioms fulfilling these
descriptive, predictive and normative demands have been (or can be)
constructed. Their counter-argument, in part, is based on the Allais paradox,
Following Allais they contend that individual values are an intuitively given
normative network which does not exhibit a sufficiently strict correlation
with preferences so as to fulfill the NM demands. Consequently they claim
that empirical behavioristic observations alone will not provide one with the
information from which a consistent set of axioms can be constructed such
that these axioms will be complete in the NM sense, i.e., at once descriptive,
predictive and normative of individual decision making.
In this paper it wit! be demonstrated that any proposal which attempts a
complete (1) descriptive, (2) predictive and (3) normative account of
individual decision making within the NM system is futile, The outline of this
proposed demonstration is as follows. First, the NM axioms are presented and
the theorem of the maximization of expected utility is derived from them,
Secondly, an account is given of the Allais paradox. This paradox resulted
from Allais' questioning of the reliability of the NM system for the prediction
of an individual's future choices. Thirdly, three proposed resolutions offered
by Leonard J. Savage, Donald Morrison and Karl Borch, respectively, are
presented. An examination of these proposals will reveal specific weaknesses
of each one. Fourthly, it will be shown that all three solutions "fail" in a
more general sense for they all exceed the boundaries of the NM system in a
very fundamental way. Finally, a suggestion for a possible resolution of the
Allais paradox will be put forth which will require the development of a new
generalized decision theory.
The NM axioms (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953: 26,27):
We consider a system U of entities U,V,w, .... In U:l relation is given, u >
v, and for any number ex, (0 < ex < 1), an operation; cxu + (I - ex)v = w.
These concepts satisfy the following axioms:
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(3: Al
u >. v is a complete ordering of U.
This means: WrIte u < v when v> u. Then:
(3: A::l) For any two u, v one and only one of the following relations holds:
u == v. II > v, u <v.
(3:A:b)
u>v,v>wimplyu>w.
Ordering and combining.
(3: B)
u < v implies that u < a u + (1 - a)v.
(3: B:a )
(3:B:b)
u > v implies that u> a u + (I - a)v.
(3:B:C)
u < w <v implies the existence of an a with au + (I - a)v < w.
(3:B:d)
u > w > v implies the existence of an a with au + (I - a)v > w.
(3:C)
Algebra of combining.
(3:C:al
au+(I -a)v=(I -a)v+au.
(3:C:b)
a(i3u + (I - i3)v = Tu + (I - T)v where T = aiJ·
The system U - i.e. in our present interpretation, the system of
(abstract) utilities - is one of numbers up to a linear transformation.
The following is a condensation of a proof that the maximization of
expected utility is a theorem of the NM axioms (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1953: 618-632).
If we define u(a 1) = 1, u(a n) = 0 then by (3:A:a) a 1 ?: x ?: anIf there exists an aI, then by (3:B:c) and (3 :B:d) x ~(al aI, ana n )·
In a similar manner for y: y ~(i31 aI, i3 nan )·
By (3 :C:a) and (3 :B:d): (x ?: y) -+ (al aI, ana n) (131 aI, i3nan) if and

.?

only if al ;;;. 131'
By definition of u this is equivalent to u(x);;;' u(y).
Thus the property of additivity of utility is satisfied under the NM
axioms.
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Diagram for the explication of the Allais Paradox (Morrison, 1967: 374):
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The paradox (Fig. I) is named for the French economist who first
irllposl,d it, Maurice Allais (Allais, 1955). In this reconstructioIl of the
f aradux the subject is asked to pick OIle of the two alternatives depicted in
~le diagram. In situation I the subject must choose between lottery 11
(getting one million dollars for sure) and the lottery 12 (getting five million
dllllars with a probability of .I 0, one million dollars with a probability of .89,
or - with a probability of .01 - ending up with nothing.) In situation II, 13
"iwS him a .I 0 probability of obtaining five million and a .90 probability of
~ettin!l nothing: 14 gives a slightly better chance (.11) of obtaining only one
~illiO;l dollars and a .89 probability of getting nothing.
]\jost subjects (including myself) would prefer 11 to 12 if they were
placed in situation L If placed in the less favorable situation II, they would
prefer 13 to 14' (This is my preference as welL)
The preference for 11 over 12 and, at the same time, 13 over 14 can be
shown to be inconsistent with respect to the NM axioms and, in particular,
inconsistent with the expected utility theorem derived from the NM axioms. 1
This demonstration reveals that the subject in Situation J, by selecting 11
over 12, is not maximizing his expected utility. But by virtue of his selection
of 11 uver 14 in Situation II the subject has made a choice which does
mHxi;llize his expected utility. This inconsistency between two pairs of
preferences made at the same time, a violation of the theorem of maximizing
expected utility, is the Allais paradox.
First L. J. Savage's attempted resolution of this paradox will be
examined. It is Savage's contention that the NM axioms are at once empirical
and normative (Savage, 1954: 97) therefore the Allais paradox is for him a
very real one. He admits that the selections of 11 over 12 and 13 over 14 at
the same time have great intuitive appeal and indeed they are the choices
which he himself would make. Although admitting that he has been lured
into Allais' clever "trap" Savage is determined to escape. He writes (Savage,
1954: 102):
"In general, a person who has tentatively accepted a normative theory
must conscientiously study situations in which the theory seems to lead him
astray; he must decide for each by reflection - deduction will typically be of
little relevance - whether to retain his initial impression of the situation or to
accept the implications of the theory for it."

>

1 Calculations ~ 11 = (LO) U ($1,000,000)
12 = (.10) U ($5,000,000) + (.89) U
12 = U
($1,000,000) + (.01) U ($0) which computes as 11 = U ($1,000,000)
($1,390,000) which is false mathematically.

>

>

13 = (.10) U ($5,000,000) + (.90) U ($0)
14 = (.11) U ($1,000,000) + (.89) U ($0)
which computes as 13 = U ($500,000)
14 = U ($110,000) which is true
mathematically.
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Because be believes his intuitive cllOlces luvc' vidimi/cll him into a
violation of the NM axioms Savage decides that this ,itu:ltlun requires
"conscientious study." His reflection bears fruit in an
scheme
which for him has intuitive appeal and additi,,)[]ally allows him to alter his
selections so that they are consistent with the NM axioms. Savage's result
permits him to preserve his "ratiunality" in the Nivl sense,
Donald Morrison similarly admits he 1',;11 victim to the Alb!, paradox
(Morrison, 1967: 373). He cl'llcedes that his choices are llKC·11Sls1c'nt with
respect to the NM aXil'l1lS. To begin his attempted resoluti~)I\ of the paradox
Morrisoll first examines Savage's proposal. Morrison's anaiy,;is and criticism of
this approach may be summarized as follows.
Savage maintains that since the NM ,'XIOl1lS are 1;,)lh empirical and
nUi:,;ative they completely characterize rational decisiun making, past,
pres(;lIt dnd futureo Since Savage wishes to behave in a rational, consistent
manner he wishes to make his decisions in such a way that these choices are
not inconsistent with the choices dictated by the NM axioms. What troubles
tlluugh inconsisteat with the NM
Savage is that his original intuitive
system, did not seem to be irrational choices. Faced with this dilemma
Savage's contention is that if a compelling argument can be put forth which
induces one to aiter his choices !11 favor of the NM axiom, he will have
succeeded in demonstrating that the original choices in violallun of those
axioms were, if not irrational, at least lJllthinking and that on reflection one
would prefer the choices gllided by the NM sYSlC'm.
\Vhile Mornson docs not specifically [eject Savage's F:solution it is clear
that he is not extremely impres'Sed with it for two reasons. First, Savage's
argument used to persuade one to alter his original choices, if indeed one has
made choices which are Allais paradoxical, does not have the intuitive appeal
that the original choices themselves have. Damaging though this criticism may
be Savage himself agrees with it (Savage, 1954: 103). Secondly, Morrison
questions Savage's implied assumption that a person put in Situation II
"should" have the same preferences when he is put in Situation l.
Morrison's response to Savage's proposed resolution of the Allais paradox
is to suggest an alternative approach; essentially Morrison i urns Savage's
solution upside-down. Instead of changing his choices so that they are
consistent with the NM axioms Morrison suggest adding assumptions such
that the original, seemingly paradoxical, choices are absorbed consistently
within a newly expanded axiomatic systenL
Before proceeding with this approach Morrison suggests ~,no(hcl possible
resolution of the paradox. Morrison contends that it might not be meaningful
to compare the two luttery situations h"';;dSC they are so differcnL If such is
the case this incomparability would 11<)[ allow (me to assert that any possible
pairs of preferences were in,:onsistcn t ~.111rrisoll dlSlnisst's t his tack as simply
ad hoc.
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:\1('1' seriolls pJ,'posal cunsists in fllrmalizing three assumptions
J[,pcnded to the N~l axioms offer lme the opportunity to make
';\IL'i'l
paradoxical choices but which, by virtue of his additional
set "j:"",
aSSllIllpti ,ns, arc consistent within this expanded axiomatic system (Fig. 2)
\\LllTisOJl's assumptions are (Morrisoll, 1967: 378,379):
l.t he: d"sirabilJiy of ending up with five million dollars is the same
whether the subject's initial asset position was zero or one million dollars.
SitJlibrh. the desirahility of ending up with one million dollars is the same
'regardk';; lIf whether the initial asset position was zero or one million dollars.
Also, fiy.:: million dollars is preferable to one million dollars.
~. It is less desirable to have an initial asset position of one million dollars
and lose it thall to start with nothing and lose nothing.
3. [dting the gain of five million dollars equal C*, and the loss of going
from 011-: million dollars to zero equal C* there exist equilibrating 1T'S for the
twO intermediate prizes of gaining one million dollars and remaining at zero

which

IV:1,;;I

'1]1[1''':\'

dollars.
It call be: shown that for certain pairs of 1T1 's and 1To's perferring 1 i and
13 need nut be inconsistent with re,pect to Morrison's expansion of the NM
system (Morrison, J 967: 381). Morrison's resolution consists in formalizing
the concept of a subject's asset position into additional assumptions which
when appended to the NM axioms has the result of confirming, under certain
conditions, the consistency of typical Allain choices.
Karl Borch, yet another victim of the Allais paradox, proposes yet
another resolution (Borch, 19.68: 488,489). His prop.:sal is fashioned after
Savage in tha t he intends to provide an intuitively appealing argument which
would persuade one to realign his choices in conformity with the NM system
if they do not 81ready so conform. But Borch goes a bit further than Savage
because uniike Savage Borch does not consider the Allais paradox a genuine
one; rather hc calls it a "trap." Presumably it is a "trap" for the
"unsophisticated," as Borch labels them, because the question, the Allais
choices, are not presented in a "neutral" manner. For this reason Borch
concludes that even Savage and Morrison are trapped into believing that
normal people would prefer a sure million to a lottery among chances at five
million, a million and nothing. Borch writes (Bc)[ch, 1968: 489),
"Both authors and the subjects may have been dazzled at the pro~pect of receiving a
million with certainty, and forget to ask themselves what they actually will do with the
money once they get it. It is not likely that they can or will spend it all, nor that they
will put all the money into a savings bank. We would not be surprised if they spent only
a small part of the money, and invested the rest in securities with a good growth
potential and small risk. This means, however, that 11 is exchanged for something very
similar to I 2'"

Concerning Borch's conclusion Ole Hagen has this rebuttal. He writes, in
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2.

( 0--0) >-

J.

(1-0)

=C ..
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(1--0)=C ..
FIGURE 2

Diagram for the explication of the Morrison Assumptions (Morrison, 1967: 379):
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a letter cummunicating with the editor of the journal Theory and Decision W.
Leinfellner,
"Th,' suggestion that the person who would reject the 1 % risk of losing a fortune in
durn for a 10% chance of increasing that fortune five times is one who is acting in an

~l_considcrcd fashion because should he get his sure million he would proceed to invest

"most" of his fortune in growth stocks is beside the point. The point is that even if the
ossessor of the million dollars did invest most of his money he would not risk losing it
;11. Therefore the comparison Barch strikes is fraudulent. Borch's comparison, if
accepted, is the real "trap."

Hagen apparently is suggesting that Borch is illegitmately converting the
Allais choices, which involve a sure-thing alternative, into choices none of
which is a sure-thing and all of which involve wme element of risk. Hagen's
criticism is well-taken. Further Borch is advising that one should treat all
one's decisions as risky ones. n is this "should" which gives rise to concern.
What is to be made of these proposals? Savage's solution would appear to
make only the rigidly rule-bound individuals rational. But is this always so?
Borch's resolution appears to make only the stock-broker types rational.
But is this always so?
Both Savage and Borch conclude that Allain paradoxical choices are
irrational. or at least ill-considered. Their premise is that the NM axioms
provide a complete descriptive, predictive and normative framework for
individual and collective decision making. Is this premise acceptable?
Morrison's reformulation of the consistency conditions embodies an
appeal to a more broadly based reconstrual of "rational" behavior. Critics of
Morrison's proposal may contend that his resolution ma~es a mockery of a
general decision procedure. This criticism is made plausible by the specific
character of Morrison's additional assumptions which clearly reveals the ad
hoc nature of his proposal.
Morrison's proposed "resolution" is, however, open to a more damaging
criticism. Rather than the resolution of a paradox Morrison has, instead,
produced an antinomy; i.e., the mutual contradiction of two inferences
deducible from one set of premises.
Allais apparently was looking for a resolution of his paradox within the
NM system, if such a resolution were to be found_ Morrison has not supplied
this. It is true that Morrison's additions to the NM axioms have made it
possible to deduce the preferences which Allais found intuitively attractive_
Unfortunately the preferences which are NM consistent are also derivable
from this expanded system. But, of course, these pairs of preferences
contradict one another in the sense that the NM pair exhibit the expected
utility theorem whereas the Allain pair do not. Thus an antinomy is revealed,
The source of the antinomy is apparent. In the expanded NM system we
have Morrison's notion of utility which entails the maximizing of expected
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utility based on one's asset position juxtaposed with the NM concept of
utility which is straight-forwardly a mathematical maximization of expected
utility. Were these two concepts of utility formalized as axioms (von
Neumann and Morgenstern have done this for their notion of utility;
Morrison has not done this although as we have recounted he has sketched
informally his intentions here) it would be clear that these axioms were
contradictory thus rendering the putative NM-Morrison set of axioms
inconsistent. Consequently Morrison's resolution reduces to the trivial for he
has only deduced a contradiction from an inconsistent set of axioms.
Morrison's proposed resolution of the Allais paradox has failed. The first
of his attempts was self-admittedly ad hoc. The second of his attempts is
trivial.
In conclusion we claim that anyone who attempts a conterminous (1)
descriptive, (2) predictive and (3) normative account of individual and
collective decision making within the NM system (or in an expanded NM
system in the intended sense of Morrison) makes extravagant demands which
will remain unfulfilled. This conclusion is a consequence of the incompati_
bility of requirements 1, 2 and 3 within the NM framework.
The first demand, the descriptive, requires the collection of sufficient
empirical preference data. Nothing, in principal, would frustrate the
fulfillment of this request.
The second demand, the predictive, requires the assumption that human
nature and, in particular, human preference behavior is essentially fixed.
Theories in the physical sciences all make an implicit appeal to a similar
principle of constancy. Perhaps in the physical sciences this assumption is
innocuous. In the social sciences this assumption certainly requires investigation and, at our present state of knowledge, remains problematic at best.
The above aside we should like to focus briefly on the third demand, the
normative.
One of Morrison's criticism of Savage's resolution was Savage's implicit
assumption that a subject "should" respond in Situation I as he responded in
Situation II for the sake of preserving his NM consistency. Borch's resolution
was criticized for Borch demanded conformity with the NM axioms and
further he demanded that one "should," when making deeisions, always
weigh uncertainty and risk. Morrison suggests that one "should" mind his
asset position before he makes an economic plunge. This advice is offered
within the context of the expanded NM system. All three of these gentlemen
clearly demand that the subject oblige himself to follow certain norms. Thus
the problem of the third, the normative, requirement.
Nowhere in the NM system or its modification as proposed by Morrison
will one find the words, "should" or "ought" expressed in norms, obligations
or deontic prescriptions. To satisfy the normative demand an assumption of
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this sort must be added to the syskm. But an addition of . iii" kind of
assumption takes us beyond the buund;J[ies of th N~II system as E is now
conceived. Therefore within the context of the NM system no resolution of
the Allais paradox is possible. Neverthek,s even though the Allais paradox is
insoluble in the NM framework it still remains a serious problem for decisiun
theorists. It would be presumptuous to propose to eliminate this problem as
casually as the above suggests. Accordingly the outline of a tentative solution
of the general problem posed by the paradox is set forth.
Rules frequently govern individual and collective decision making as
obligations or norms for a specific case. Sometimes these rules arc made quite
explicit and arc codified as laws. More often these rules are informal, implicit.
perhaps even unknown. Whatever the form these rules may take, be,cause of
their clcontic aspect, they may allow us to give the NM system the same
interpretation as regards individual choices for the future as we interpreted
the system for individual choices in the past. What we desire then is a new
generalized decision theory which will couple the NM systrm with obligations
or norms of rational behavior.
For a start we may safely assume that norms of rational behavior, as all
specific rules, will have an "if ... then" character. For example, if you wish
to win at chess then you must play expertly, of course, but first you must
know and obey the rules of the game. If you do not wish to win at chess and
further don't even wish to play the game you have, of course, no need to
know or obey the rules. Similarly, if you are convinced of the efficacy of the
NM axioms you may believe you should make choices in conformity with
them. Perhaps you will select another system a la Morrison. Regaruless, the
advantage of viewing decisions as rule-bound is that it enables one to see
clearly that a condemnation of particular choices as irrational makes no sense
unless one understands the normative framework within which the s;; bject
believes himself to be operating.
Leinfellner has suggested an approach similar to this (Leinfellnet, 1973).
He has proposed that a union of the NM system with decision rules using
deontic operators may permit us to give this supplemented NM system an
interpretation concerning decision making for the future, depending upon the
deontic formulation used. Whatever the form this final reconstruction may
take we are sure that it will provide for a construal of the nature of values in
the Allain sense along with the preservation of the NM system all within a
new generalized decision theory. Only when this occurs can the Allais
paradox truly be resolved.
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